Will the Arab Region Build Up Sufficient Resilience Before the Next Youth Explosion?
About
This Article by Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj is informed by our consultant’s work on a research and policy project commissioned in 2018 by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN ESCWA) to examine conflicts in the Arab region and forecast future scenarios for development in the region. The research project is being reviewed and updated for a forthcoming paper to be published this year.
Full Article
In 2011 a wave of protests surged in many Arab countries leading to an initial momentum for change and optimism that soon translated into chaos and conflict. While many theories were proposed to explain the phenomenon of the “Arab Spring”, statistically there was little evidence-based research on the drivers of such social movements and their eventual transformation into conflict in several Arab States. Corruption levels, poor governance and inequalities were wavering within the typical ranges for the region, with some deterioration in some indicators being followed by improvements of others. The collapse of the political economy was not a phenomenon of extremes, but the complex interplay of various factors that created a tipping point. Statistically, among the primary factors that drove the conditions of many Arab countries to the brink of fragility were related to two main drivers. The first being the youth bulge that witnessed in the region, where young people born some 20 years earlier reached a demographic peak in a region that was ill equipped to provide jobs, housing, and political space for its youth. The second factor was a black swan in the guise of the economic crisis that followed the global financial markets meltdown in 2008. A perfect storm swept the region.
The youth bulge in the Arab region coincided with the irruption of the 2011 protests. Estimates of population counts and future projections till 2050 are provided by the UN Population Division. Link >
Some countries managed to avoid the crisis by borrowing money and spending on enhanced consumption to ease the burden of the crisis on their citizens, but for many countries the state’s move to contain the situation was too little too late. Most countries in the region saw their fiscal space dedicated to development shrinking as a result. The “Arab Spring” created a conflict eco-system in the region. The region hosts the highest levels of displaced persons in the world, it succumbs to the direst environmental impacts of global warming and climate change and has some of the highest corruption levels and elite grab on power in the world. Conflict drivers operate on three interlocking scales: local, national, and regional. Conflict drivers are not the same for all countries, but they are part of an eco-system where stability of one country is incumbent on the stability of others. While some countries managed to waver the first “Arab Spring”, the region has diverted a larger percentage of its income to militarization; regional stabilization factors such as intra-regional trade and FDI’s are declining; and environmental factors like water shortages are exacerbated. Meanwhile a new youth bulge is looming on the horizon starting in 2028-2029.
Schematic diagram showing the interplay of conflict drivers in the region.
Local, national, and regional factors are interconnected and feed onto each other. The surge of another youth bulge will bring the conditions of the regions to the brink of collapse within the horizon of 2030. The 8 most interconnected conflict drivers can be quantified and a general stability indicator for the region shows where things are heading should the status quo on regional tensions and conflicts remain unresolved. Resilience of most Arab countries has not recovered, and the regional opportunities to heal fast before the next crisis are dim. The next explosion of youth in the region is likely to irrupt in much poorer cities, living under more corrupt elite dominated governance systems, with little absorption capacity of most Arab States to absorb further debt, and with radicalization and the emergence of non-state actors being the main channel of attracting disgruntled youth. The results will be catastrophic not only for the region, but on a global scale.
Projections of conflict drivers in the region under a status quo scenario.
To avoid this scenario, regional actors need to move quickly. Three key interventions are needed:
De-escalate regional conflicts among the largest protagonists in the region. But also work to bring the different proxy wars being fought through non-state actors in the different regional civil wars to a reasonable end. This requires global and regional State actors to establish political-security understandings that serves stability and facilitates national transitions towards peace and development.
The State actors in the region need to build an effective intra-regional economic-security cooperation framework to reduce the prospects of future conflicts and deal with the generational ramifications of the current ones.
Shift a reasonable share of the region’s resources from non-productive sectors towards investment in productive developmental sectors. The region needs to sustain a 5% GDP growth every year, and channel that growth to tangible developmental results. This will also entail diverting military spending towards development funding, debt relief for the weaker economies and developing cross regional value chains to lift the war-torn economies and create opportunities for inclusive reconstruction.
The above cannot happen without a dramatic improvement in good governance, in particular as regards rule of law and government effectiveness. The region needs to develop better accountability frameworks and allow for the youth to engage in the public sphere in a constructive manner.
These changes are on the horizon of some of the regional actors today, but the speed and depth of the transformation needs more rigor. Cosmetic gestures will not avoid the next regional crisis looming in the very foreseeable future. The next crisis will go beyond the events of 2011, and will have profound global ramifications.
Date: 13 February 2024
Credits: Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj >
Related Projects
Year: 2017-2018
Client: ESCWA – United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
A research project examines conflicts in the Arab region and their impact on the 2030 Development Agenda. We analyse historical trends, direct and indirect impacts of conflicts on development, long-term conflict patterns, future scenarios, and provide policy recommendations to achieve sustainable development and peace in the region.
Year: 2017 - 2018
Client: ESCWA – United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
A project to develop future scenarios for the Arab region, focusing on regional challenges associated with conflicts and their impacts on the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Development Agenda.
Header Photo
Protests against lack of reforms and deterioration of living standards, a month before the explosion of the port of Beirut. Lebanon. July 7th 2020. Photo © Simon Haddad - via ShutterStock. Link >