The choices Syria makes about land, investment and public finance will shape not only its urban recovery, but also the distribution of economic power for decades to come. The central challenge is not to create a perfectly just urban economy, but to build a more equitable one: an economy that expands opportunity, creates multipliers, supports dignified livelihoods and prevents a narrow group of actors from controlling land, capital and markets.

In the third episode of Urban Liwan | ليوان عمراني, LUGARIT co-founder Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj joins architect and urbanist Massa Al Moselly to examine the political economy of Syrian cities. Their conversation traces how the economic value of land has shifted historically from agriculture to industry, services and, increasingly, to real estate speculation. It shows how policies intended to curb private speculation often created state monopolies that failed to supply sufficient housing, contributed to informal urban growth and enabled new networks of privilege to control access to land.

Syria’s transition now risks replacing one economic oligarchy with another. Investment is urgently needed, but attracting capital cannot be the sole measure of success. When real estate generates higher and faster returns than agriculture, industry or productive services, it diverts resources from activities that create lasting employment and economic resilience. Large projects may produce short-term liquidity while consuming scarce urban land, increasing infrastructure burdens and generating limited permanent employment.

The episode therefore presents urban planning as an economic instrument. Planning must protect land for agriculture, industry, housing, public services and future urban needs—not merely allocate sites to the highest bidder. Land value capture instruments can help ensure that investors who benefit from public infrastructure and planning decisions contribute to the wider city, whether through taxation, services, affordable housing or other shared benefits.

The discussion also argues for broadening participation in the economy. Most Syrian expatriates are not major investors, but potential micro, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs. Enabling them—and local businesses—to enter the market can strengthen competition, employment and the re-emergence of a middle class. Similarly, informal economic activity cannot simply be regulated out of existence while poverty sustains demand for it. Gradual formalisation requires improved incomes, increased purchasing power within the average households, accessible finance and support for small enterprises.

Improving public finance to support reconstruction should not be limited to attracting foreign investments. A reasonable level of public debt to finance productive infrastructure, coupled with a transparent and equitable tax system can help bridge initial shortages in public equity. The issue of public debt is not an either/or question. It is about how to design and manage fiscal cycles to expand the fiscal space.  

Ultimately, Syria needs investment that produces economic multipliers: creating durable employment, increasing household purchasing power and generating demand across the wider economy. Recovery will become more equitable when land and finance are used to expand productive capacity rather than concentrate speculative gains.